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M e a n i n g ,  M e a n i n g s ,  a n d  E p i s t e m o l o g y
i n  C . S .  l e w i s
C h a r l i e  W .  S t a r r
An obscure film (perhaps a Fellini or a D avid Lynch), a bizarre piece of 
m odern  art, or a complex poem  frequently evoke from  m y students the 
question, "W hat does it m ean?" —and they take for granted  that they know  
exactly w hat they are asking. That they should not be so certain of the question 
w ould  become apparen t after a m om ent of reflection if they w ould  step one 
question back and ask, "W hat does meaning m ean?" Asking the m eaning of 
meaning is a quandary  because the very question presupposes a know ledge of the 
answer. W ebster's Dictionary suggests three common uses of the term: 
"intention" (as w hen we ask w hat a person m eant by  a certain remark), 
"signification" (as w hen we ask the m eaning of a w ord or a poem), and 
"im portance" (as w hen we say that a m om entous life event w as a "m eaningful" 
one). W hen C.S. Lewis w rote about m eaning, it was usually  in reference to 
signification, and in one of two ways. The them e that dom inates Lewis's w riting 
about meaning is an epistemological one: Lewis believed that the relationship 
betw een sign and signified was m uch broader than the cognitive act of assigning 
abstract symbols to ideas and experiences. W henever we ask w hat som ething 
m eans, we are alm ost always looking for a response in w ords; tha t is, we have 
come to believe (or at least practice) the concept tha t m eaning consists of ideas 
that can be expressed in propositional language statements. Lewis understood 
tha t the m eaning of meaning is m uch larger, preceding abstraction, reason, and 
even language, and his understanding  has implications, not only to a proper 
understand ing  of the natu re  of m eaning, b u t also to our understand ing  of myth, 
truth, allegory, m etaphor, epistemology, and even the nature of heaven. The 
m inor them e in Lewis's w riting on meaning involves his in terest in the critical 
question of the correct in terpretation of literary texts (in this theme, Lewis is 
concerned w ith  both "signification" and "intention"). W here in his major them e 
Lewis is concerned w ith  the epistem ology of meaning, in his m inor them e he is 
concerned w ith  meanings in texts.
The Major Theme: M ea n in g  and Knowing
To understand  Lewis's view  of m eaning as a concept, we begin w ith 
three enigmatic bu t foundational passages. In the first passage, from  The Last
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Battle, Lewis is describing the new  Narnia, the heavenly N arnia w hich tu rns out 
to be "[m]ore like the real thing" (210). We learn that the old N arnia, the only one 
ever know n in the books, "w as not the real Narnia. That had  a beginning and an 
end. It w as only a shadow  or a copy of the real Narnia, which has always been 
here and always will be here" (211-12). Lewis continues:
It is as hard to explain how this sunlit land was different from the old 
Narnia, as it would be to tell you how the fruits of that country taste. 
Perhaps you will get some idea of it, if you think like this. You may have 
been in a room in which there was a window that looked out on a lovely 
bay of the sea or a green valley that wound away among mountains. And 
in the wall of that room opposite to the window there may have been a 
looking glass. And as you turned away from the window you suddenly 
caught sight of that sea or that valley, all over again, in the looking glass.
And the sea in the mirror, or the valley in the mirror, were in one sense 
just the same as the real ones: yet at the same time they were somehow 
different—deeper, more wonderful, more like places in a story: in a story 
you have never heard but very much want to know. The difference 
between the old Narnia and the new Narnia was like that. The new one 
was a deeper country: every rock and flower and blade of grass looked as 
if it meant more. I can't describe it any better than that: if you ever get 
there you will know what I mean. (212-13)
The m ost significant part of the passage above is the line, "as if it m eant m ore." A 
quality  of the new  N arnia w hich contrasts it w ith the old is its apparen t increase 
in size (210), bu t this tu rns out not to be so m uch an increase in physical size as in 
the largeness of its being (the new  N arnia looks m ore "like the real thing" [210]). 
A nd as being increases, so does m eaning. Read in isolation, the passage could 
suggest W ebster's th ird  definition, "im portance." A reading of other passages in 
w hich m eaning is associated w ith heavenly realm s or creatures, however, will 
suggest that "signification" is the definition of m eaning Lewis is concerned w ith 
in The Last Battle.
The second enigm atic passage occurs in That Hideous Strength. The 
divine plan for the destruction of the N.I.C.E., the governm ent-backed institution 
through w hich dem onic forces are gaining control of England, calls for the 
descent of angels. The great e ld ila—the ruling  intelligences of the p lanets—will 
descend to Earth and pour their pow ers into a reaw akened M erlin. H e will be 
their instrum ent of victory. The first to descend is the angel of language, Mercury. 
To this descent Ransom, the protagonist of Lewis's space trilogy and the leader of 
the forces for good in this novel, is a witness:
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Ransom gripped the side of his sofa; Merlin grasped his own knees and 
set his teeth. [...] Quick agitation seized them: a kind of boiling and 
bubbling in mind and heart which shook their bodies also. [ . ]  It was well 
that both m en had some knowledge of poetry. The doubling, splitting, and 
recombining of thoughts which now went on in them would have been 
unendurable for one whom that art had not already instructed in the 
counterpoint of the mind, the mastery of doubled and trebled vision. For 
Ransom, whose study had been for many years in the realm of words, it 
was heavenly pleasure. He found himself sitting within the very heart of 
language, in the white-hot furnace of essential speech. All fact was broken, 
splashed into cataracts, caught, turned inside out, kneaded, slain, and 
reborn as meaning. (321-22)
As w ith the N arnia passage, m eaning is a key elem ent in the experience of divine 
presence. But how  heaven can "m ean" m ore or have greater signification in it 
than earth, or how  fact can be converted into pure "m eaning" is not explained.
Lewis is no m ore clear about his concept of m eaning in "Bluspels and 
Flalansferes," a w ork of literary critical theory, than he is in the fiction works 
above. "Bluspels" is a study  in literal versus figurative or m etaphorical language 
near the end of w hich Lewis concludes that, in the history of w riting, those who 
think them selves the m ost literal and precise have the least to say, and that "great 
creators of m etaphor" are the "m asters of m eaning" (156-57). In this context 
Lewis proceeds w ith the essay's final paragraph:
It will have escaped no one that in such a scale of writers the poets will 
take the highest place; and among the poets those who have at once the 
tenderest care for old words and the surest instinct for the creation of new 
metaphors. But it must not be supposed that I am in any sense putting 
forward the imagination as the organ of truth. We are not talking of truth, 
but of meaning: meaning which is the antecedent condition both of truth 
and falsehood, whose antithesis is not error but nonsense. I am a 
rationalist. For me, reason is the natural organ of truth; but imagination is 
the organ of meaning. Imagination, producing new metaphors or 
revivifying old, is not the cause of truth, but its condition. It is, I confess, 
undeniable that such a view indirectly implies a kind of truth or rightness 
in the imagination itself. I said at the outset that the truth we won by 
metaphor could not be greater than the truth of the metaphor itself; and 
we have seen since that all our truth, or all but a few fragments, is won by 
metaphor. And thence, I confess, it does follow that if our thinking is ever 
true, then the metaphors by which we think must have been good 
metaphors. (157-58)
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W hat frustrates our understand ing  here is that key statem ents Lewis m akes 
about reason, imagination, tru th  and m eaning in this passage appear as an after­
thought, an addendum  of clarification, to the rest of the "Bluspels" essay w ith 
little clear connection to it. Thus, Lewis's frequently quoted definitions of 
im agination as the "organ of m eaning" and m eaning as the "antecedent 
condition both of tru th  and falsehood" have little context in which to be 
explained. The "Bluspels" essay alone will no t explain w hat Lewis is saying 
about the m eaning of meaning.
W hat is needed, then, is to d raw  from  a variety of sources in the Lewis 
corpus to understand  his epistem ology of m eaning and therefore better our own. 
At the heart of Lewis's concept of m eaning is an epistemological dilem m a which 
he discusses in his essay "M yth Became Fact":
H um an intellect is incurably abstract. Pure mathematics is the type of 
successful thought. Yet the only realities we experience are concrete—this 
pain, this pleasure, this dog, this man. While we are loving the man, 
bearing the pain, enjoying the pleasure, we are not intellectually 
apprehending Pleasure, Pain, or Personality. When we begin to do so, on 
the other hand, the concrete realities sink to the level of mere instances or 
examples: we are no longer dealing w ith them, but with that which they 
exemplify. This is our dilem m a—either to taste and not to know or to 
know and not to taste—or, more strictly, to lack one kind of knowledge 
because we are in an experience or to lack another kind because we are 
outside it. [...]
Of this tragic dilemma myth is the partial solution. In the enjoyment of 
a great myth we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can 
otherwise be understood only as an abstraction. ("Myth Became Fact" 65­
66)
It is in this epistemological context that Lewis goes on to the definitions 
frequently referenced in studies on his view  of m yth; however, im m ediately 
im portant is our understanding  of the epistemological dilem m a of thinking 
(which is abstract) and experiencing (which is concrete). The concrete/abstract 
dilem m a keeps us from  ever know ing a th ing completely. We can think about it; 
we can experience it. We cannot do both simultaneously, and each has its limits 
w hen isolated. This epistemological problem  is the result of a m ore basic one, the 
separation of subject from  object.
Because we (the thinking subject) are constantly separated from  the 
objects of life about w hich we w ant to know, we are never able sim ultaneously to 
both experience them  and think about them. But in w hat w ay are we separated 
from  the objects we w ant to know? A nsw ering this question requires the 
recognition of yet another separation, that betw een m atter and spirit, which
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Leanne Payne notes is not so m uch in reality as in our perceptions of it: "for 
Lewis the sharp division of nature from  super-nature, of m atter from  created 
spirit, m ay be an accident of our lim ited point of view" (46). M ineko H onda 
connects the subject/object split w ith  the m atter/sp irit split in Lewis's thinking: 
"Lewis believes in heaven as the w orld of objective Reality to w hich our present 
w orld is, as it were, only a w orld of subjectivity" (101). H onda directs us to a 
description of heaven in Letters to Malcolm:
It is like seeing nature itself rising from its grave. What was sown in 
momentariness is raised in still permanence. What was sown as a 
becoming, rises as being. Sown in subjectivity, it rises in objectivity. The 
transitory secret of two is now a chord in the ultimate music. [...] [T]he 
hills and valleys of Heaven will be to those you now experience not as a 
copy is to an original, nor as a substitute is to the genuine article, but as 
the flower to the root, or the diamond to the coal. (Malcolm 123)
If, in our current w orld, we live in a state w here we, as subjects, are constantly 
separated from  the objects we w ould  know, and if this is indeed because we face 
a disconnection am ong m atter, m ind, and spirit, then the problem  of thinking 
and experiencing, of abstract analysis and concrete aw areness is clarified. We are 
unable to both experience and th ink about anything (and  therefore completely 
know  it) because we are only able to connect to it as m atter. Spirit, in this m odel 
of knowing, becomes the conduit (in this case the m issing conduit) between 
subjective m ind  and external object.
If hum anity  lived in a w orld like the heaven Lewis describes in the 
passage from  Letters to Malcolm above, spirit w ould  be m ore fully connecting all 
subjects to all objects so that to experience a th ing in the body and to th ink about 
its significance w ould be a single, sim ultaneous activity. As in Lewis's new  
Narnia, everything w ould mean more. In heaven, spirit connects the subjective to 
the objective, the m ind  to the experience and even the thing being experienced, 
so that to experience is to kn o w —to taste and see—the m eaning in an instant. 
This is w hat Lewis m eans in That Hideous Strength w hen he says that fact is 
broken dow n and converted into m eaning in the presence of the 'angel of 
language,' the m ediating spirit betw een subject and object.
To the dichotom ies above we m ight add  that spirit connects the abstract 
to the concrete, bu t "M yth Became Fact" suggests a m ore complex activity. First 
Lewis m akes a connection between "m yth" and "reality" and a separation of 
"reality" from  "tru th": "W hat flows into you from  the m yth  is not tru th  but 
reality (truth is always about something, bu t reality is that about which tru th  is)"
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(66). Reality (or fact1) is w hat is; tru th  is a proposition about fact. A little later in 
the paragraph Lewis notes that m yth  is not "like direct experience," and in the 
following paragraph he asserts that m yth  "comes dow n from  the heaven of 
legend and im agination to the earth  of history" (66). Though Lewis is using the 
term s "heaven" and "earth" m etaphorically in this line, that he attributes the 
epistemological dilem m a to our current earthly state and its solution to heaven, 
or the m arriage of heaven and earth (or even, as will be show n later, to an 
unfallen earthly paradise) is suggested in The Last Battle passage above, apparent 
in the passage quoted from  Letters to Malcolm, and will be further supported 
hereafter.
Next, Lewis describes our earthly existence as a "valley of separation" 
(66m ). H e suggests, "M yth is the m ountain whence all the different stream s arise 
w hich become tru ths dow n here in the valley; in hac valle abstractionis" (66). W hat 
is Lewis saying about reality in this m etaphor? "M yth Became Fact" is here 
revealing interconnected realities: the reality we experience on earth, the 
cognitive experience of m aking abstract statem ents of tru th  about that reality, 
and the experience of a transcendent som ething (a higher reality, a m yth-like 
heavenly realm) in m ythic stories.
H ere a note on Lewis's P latonism  adds clarity. In The Last Battle, Digory, 
looking about at the new  N arnia, seeing that it is a fuller, m ore real version of the 
old Narnia, com ments that "It's all in Plato, all in Plato" (212). Plato believed in a
1 A thorough reading of Lewis shows that he uses the terms "fact" and "reality" 
synonymously. In "Myth Became Fact," Lewis distinguishes between "truth" and "reality": 
"truth is always about something, but reality is that about which truth is" (66). Consider a 
similar passage from Miracles: "Events in general are not 'about' anything and cannot be 
true or false. (To say 'these events, or facts are false' means of course that someone's 
account of them is false.)" (27). Lewis equates "events" with "facts" and says of the 
relationship between "events" and "truth" the same thing he says of "reality" and "truth." 
In the paragraph that follows the one quoted above from "Myth Became Fact," Lewis 
argues that "the heart of Christianity is a myth which is also a fact. [...] It happens—at a 
particular date, in a particular place, followed by definable historical consequences" (66). 
This line makes synonymous connections between "fact" and "history," and "fact" and 
"events" (the reference, "It happens"). Several passages in Miracles indicate these and other 
synonymous connections. In noting that "concrete, individual, determinate things do now 
exist," Lewis demands that these "are not mere principles or generalities or theorems, but 
things—facts—real, resistant existences" (115). He shortly thereafter refers to the "brute 
fact of existence, the fact that it is actually there and is itself." Lewis says "a complete 
philosophy must get in all the facts" (58) and then later refers to the "rightful demand that 
all reality should be consistent and systematic" (83). Even stronger are the references to 
God as "the basic, original, self-existent Fact" (43), and as "an uncreated and unconditioned 
reality" (105). The connection between "fact" and "reality" is clear.
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higher w orld of ideal form s where, for example, the concept of a chair on earth 
w as an abstraction of the concrete universal form  of a chair in Plato's higher 
world. Lewis's Platonic thinking in "M yth Became Fact" is one in w hich idea and 
form, separated here in the valley below, come together on the m ountain above 
w here abstract ideas become concrete forms. Lewis was here heavily influenced 
by Abbott's Flatland (a book to w hich Lewis refers, or from  w hich he borrows, in 
several texts, m ost directly in "Bluspels and Flalansferes"). In the book, the 
higher dim ensions of existence have higher dim ensions of space. Beyond 
Lineland is Flatland, above w hich is Spaceland, above which, it is hypothesized, 
there is a four dim ensional space w here objects have m ore sides and lines than 
any below. This hypothesized w orld of four spatial dim ensions is called 
"Thoughtland" (Abbott 73). In that place m ust dwell "Extra-Solids" and perhaps 
"Double Extra-Solids" (77). But it is a w orld of thought. Perhaps this is Lewis's 
vision (in Letters to Malcolm) w hen he says heaven is a place w here subject and 
object come together: thought and form  become one w hen subject experiences 
object.2 But a clear indication of Lewis's thinking can be found in The Great 
Divorce. A ghostly m an w ho has a passion for inquiry  (though not for actually 
finding any truth) is visiting the outskirts of heaven. There he m eets an old friend 
w ho has m oved beyond the ghostly stage to full presence, full being in heaven. 
The glorified m an is there to invite the ghost to go further in. But the ghost 
refuses unless certain guarantees are met, especially "an  atm osphere of free 
inquiry" (43). The glorified m an tells his friend he will find no such thing; he will 
find final answers. The ghost responds that there is "som ething stifling about the 
idea of finality" to w hich the other replies, "You think that, because hitherto  you 
have experienced tru th  only w ith the abstract intellect. I will bring you w here 
you can taste it like honey and be em braced by  it as by  a bridegroom " (43). Thus, 
in Lewis's Platonic vision, w hat can only be an abstract idea on earth is concrete 
reality in heaven.
Rather than saying, then, that abstract is connected to concrete in 
heavenly realm s in Lewis's epistemology, it is better to say that, w hen one leaves 
the valley of abstraction (the earth  of our current epistemological experience) for 
the m ountain of m yth  (the heaven Lewis describes in Letters to Malcolm and The 
Great Divorce), abstraction and separation disappear as w hat become abstract 
tru ths here in the valley are followed to their concrete m ythic sources on the 
m ountaintop. There is, therefore, no place along the stream  pouring from  the
2 Lewis would not say that subject and object fuse so completely in heaven as to become 
indistinguishable. His concept of Trinity is the mirror of his concept of humanity in 
heaven—they are one and many (The Problem of Pain 150). Instead, subject and object draw 
near, commingling but not consuming, so that the experiencing of the object is 
instantaneously correspondent with a knowledge of its meaning. The form is the idea; all 
ideas become objects capable of being experienced. Fact is transformed into meaning.
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m ountain  dow n into the valley ("M yth Became Fact" 66) w here one m ay stop 
and say, "here is tru th  bu t there is m yth." The separation no longer exists. 
Experiencing and thinking sim ply become knowing.
How, then, do Lewis's ideas about abstract and concrete know ing relate 
to his concept of m eaning? In "M yth Became Fact," Lewis refers to the "abstract 
m eaning" of a story (66). This line appears to equate m eaning w ith tru th  (since 
tru th  is defined as abstractions that come dow n to the valley from  the concrete 
m ountain  of m yth). However, as we saw  in "Bluspels," Lewis clearly states that 
tru th  (associated w ith reason) and m eaning (associated w ith im agination) are not 
the same th ing (157). So we m ust return  to "M yth Became Fact" to look at Lewis's 
use of the term  "m eaning":
I am trying to understand something very abstract indeed—the fading, 
vanishing of tasted reality as we try to grasp it w ith the discursive reason. 
Probably I have made heavy weather of it. But if I remind you, instead, of 
Orpheus and Eurydice, how he was suffered to lead her by the hand but, 
when he turned round to look at her, she disappeared, what was merely a 
principle becomes imaginable. You may reply that you never till this 
moment attached that 'meaning' to that myth. Of course not. You are not 
looking for an abstract 'meaning' at all. If that was what you were doing 
the myth would be for you no true myth but a mere allegory. You were not 
knowing, but tasting; but what you were tasting turns out to be a 
universal principle. The moment we state this principle, we are admittedly 
back in the world of abstraction. It is only while receiving the myth as a 
story that you experience the principle concretely. (66)
Sense can be m ade of the term  meaning here by beginning w ith the last sentence. 
W hen we receive m yth  as story, we are experiencing a principle concretely. O nly 
w hen we p u t the experience into w ords does the principle become abstract. But if 
we can know  a principle either concretely or by  abstraction, then m eaning can be 
either concrete or abstract. This agrees w ith the statem ent in "Bluspels" that 
m eaning is the necessary antecedent condition to tru th  (157). Some m eanings are 
abstract statements. Some abstract statements, like, "The Cobra's bite is lethal," 
correspond to reality and are therefore true. Lewis defined tru th  as "an  external 
correspondence of statem ent and reality" (from the m inutes of the Oxford 
Socratic Club, qtd. in Hooper, "Oxford's Bonny Fighter" 153). But statem ents 
require the use of w ords and w ords m ust have m eanings—they m ust signify 
som ething (or else they are nonsense words, and Lewis says in "Bluspels" [157] 
that nonsense is the opposite of meaning). M eaning is the antecedent condition 
of tru th  because tru th  is a statem ent corresponding to reality and such 
statem ents have m eaning. In addition, however, there are other kinds of 
m eanings, kinds that can only be apprehended in the im agination.
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In Lewis's thinking, tru th  statem ents are m eanings about reality that 
have been abstracted out of reality, bu t there are other k inds of m eanings, m ythic 
ones, that come prior to abstraction and apart from  language. H ere we tu rn  to 
Lewis's Introduction to his George MacDonald: A n  Anthology:
We all agree that the story of Balder is a great myth, a thing of 
inexhaustible value. But of whose version—whose words — are we thinking 
when we say this?
For my own part, the answer is that I am not thinking of anyone's 
words. No poet, as far as I know or can remember, has told this story 
supremely well. I am not thinking of any particular version of it. If the 
story is anywhere embodied in words, that is almost an accident. What 
really delights and nourishes me is a particular pattern of events, which 
would equally delight and nourish if it had reached me by some medium 
which involved no words at all — say by a mime, or a film. [...] In this 
respect stories of the mythical type are at the opposite pole from lyrical 
poetry. If you try to take the "theme" of Keats's Nightingale apart from the 
very words in which he has embodied it, you find that you are talking 
about almost nothing. Form and content can there be separated only by a 
false abstraction. But in a m yth—in a story where the mere pattern of 
events is all that m atters—this is not so. Any means of communication 
whatever which succeeds in lodging those events in our imagination has, 
as we say, "done the trick". After that you can throw the means of 
communication away. [...] In poetry the words are the body and the 
"theme" or "content" is the soul. But in m yth the imagined events are the 
body and something inexpressible is the soul: the words, or mime, or film, 
or pictorial series are not even clothes—they are not much more than a 
telephone. (26-28)
Lewis suggests that any form  of com munication, even m im e or film, m ight 
deliver the m ythic story. Even in a m yth  that is received through language, the 
specific language will likely disappear from  m em ory; w hat will rem ain are the 
im ages and events of the story. In this text Lewis calls m yth  a "particular pattern 
of events" (27). Perhaps as a pattern, though, m yth  is a kind or m ode of 
languaging (m y term ) itself, a language not of w ords bu t of images. In A  Preface to 
Paradise Lost, Lewis says as much: "giants, dragons, paradises, gods, and the 
like are them selves the expression of certain basic elements in m an's spiritual 
experience. In that sense they are m ore like w o rd s—the w ords of a language 
w hich speaks the else unspeakable" (57). I have suggested the term  "languaging" 
here to first indicate that, like language, m yth  com m unicates something, second 
that the content of m yth  is, nevertheless, not dependent on language, and th ird  
that m yth  is capable of a richer kind of signification than is language (w ith one
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near exception—see Barfield on m etaphor below). Lewis's contrasting of m yth 
and allegory offers insight into this possibility.
In the sixth descriptor in Lewis's list of m yth's qualities from  A n  
Experiment in Criticism, he says m yth  com m unicates the num inous, a sense of 
som ething great w hich the m ind  struggles to grasp conceptually (44). This 
conceptual struggle results in the "persistent tendency of hum anity  to provide 
m yths w ith allegorical explanations" (44); however, the m yth  will continue to 
m ean  m ore. Lewis understood  a difference betw een m yth  and allegory very 
early in his thinking. A discussion on the composition of Dymer, one of Lewis's 
earliest poems, yields a determ ination by the young poet "to keep the MYTH 
true and in trude as little invention of conscious allegory as m ight be" (All M y  
Road 16 M ay 1922, 35). The w ord "conscious" here is key. Lewis describes the 
m ajor difference between m yth  and allegory as having to do w ith  conscious 
intention and m ultiplicity of m eanings. Later in life he says,
M y view w d be that a good m yth (i.e. a story out of which ever varying 
meanings will grow for different readers and in different ages) is a higher 
thing than an allegory (into which one meaning has been put). Into an 
allegory a m an can put only what he already knows; in a myth he puts 
what he does not yet know and cd not come to know in any other way. 
(Letters 22 September 1956, 458)
Allegory is conscious and its m eanings are specific. In allegory correlation 
betw een sign and signified is consciously, deliberately applied; the sign has only 
such m eaning as is predeterm ined by the author.3 In m yth, on the other hand, 
m eanings are m ultiple, fluid, and greater than the author's conscious intent. The 
difference betw een allegory and m yth  can be form ulated as follows: whereas 
allegory contains m eaning, m yth  sim ply means.
M yth is superior to language (and allegory) because it speaks w ithout 
abstracting. Furtherm ore, Lewis believes that "w hat is expressed in m yth  is 
divine m etaphysical Reality" (Honda 36). N ow  the conception of tru th  we have 
learned from  Lewis (in "M yth Became Fact") is that, on earth, tru th  is abstract 
statem ents that correspond w ith reality; however, in the divine realm, such
3 Scholars have noted that Lewis's thoughts on the nature of allegory are inconsistent. His 
distinction of allegory from myth, however, is not, and whenever he discusses allegory in 
relation to myth his thinking remains consistent with the ideas represented in the letter of 
22 September 1956. Readers interested in an analysis of Lewis's theory of allegory should 
read the paper by Myers and the two papers by Piehler listed in the bibliography.
170 Mythlore 97/98 Spring/Summer 2007
Meaning, Meanings, and Epistemology in  C.S. Lewis
abstractions as tru th  are concrete, even a Person (Divorce 43).4 This is the only 
w ay to explain how  Lewis can say m yth carries no specific tru th  statem ents 
(abstractions are couched in allegory instead), bu t still shows us som ething of 
reality: higher reality. Like that higher reality, the m eanings in m yth  are m ultiple 
and  deeper, and  like that higher reality, abstraction gives w ay to the concrete in 
m yth  so that tru th  is no  longer statem ent bu t reality itself, know n not through 
abstract language which conveys m eaning bu t through the m ythic m ode of 
languaging: an experience which sim ply means.
In "Is Theology Poetry?" Lewis says m yth  can carry tru th  (82). H ow  
does this fit in w ith w hat we have learned so far? M yth can bear abstract truths, 
bu t not in the one-for-one sense that allegory does. M yth contains a plurality  of 
m eanings. A  few of those m eanings are also truths/correspondences w ith reality 
(Lewis's idea in "Bluspels and Flalansferes" that m eaning is an antecedent to 
tru th  [157]), bu t m ore m eaning exists in the m yth  than just those tru th  
correspondences. This is one distinction between m yth  and allegory. But there is 
another. The activity of abstracting tru ths from  allegory is m ore conscious and 
analytical. Receiving m eaning from  m yth, though, is im aginative, intuitive. 
Therefore, w hen we find tru th  in m yth, we are not reading it as m yth  bu t are 
allegorizing the m yth. Lewis says this is the very thing people constantly do w ith 
m yth  (Experiment 44). Though it is not the best w ay to read myth, that Lewis 
believes m yth  contains tru th  shows that it is a valid w ay to read m yth. This is true 
especially w hen the m yth  is God's myth, given in the person of Christ ("M yth 
Became Fact" 66-67) or in God's m ythology to the H ebrew s (Miracles 176n.).
The question that rem ains is how  does m yth  com municate m eaning 
w ithout using language? I have suggested the idea of languaging (comm unication 
in im aginative form  apart from  language) as an answer. For guidance on this 
question we tu rn  to the w riting of Lewis's friend Owen Barfield. H is w ork Poetic 
Diction influenced m uch of Lewis's theories on m yth, as Lewis notes in Surprised 
by Joy: "M uch of the thought w hich [Barfield] afterw ard p u t into Poetic Diction 
h ad  already become m ine before that im portant little book appeared" (200).
Barfield's contention is that linguistic history shows that w ords in the 
past d id  not begin as literal term s w hich later took on m etaphorical m eaning. On 
the contrary, m any w ords taken as literal today are in fact dead m etaphors. Lewis 
says as m uch in "Bluspels and Flalansferes." But far in the past, as the record of 
w ords shows, the distinction betw een literal and figurative sim ply d id  not exist 
in language, and if not in language then not in hum an  thinking. There was no
4 The reader may be interested in Charles A. Huttar's discussion of Lewis's theory of 
language as revealed in his poetry. Huttar focuses on the limitations of language and its 
connections to higher reality; see especially pages 103-07.
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concrete/abstract split in hum an experience, and therefore no subject/object split. 
The earliest languages show  that hum an beings d id  not have separate w ords for 
abstract ideas and concrete objects. All w ords contained both literal and abstract 
m eanings. W hy d id  people use language this way? Because they thought this 
w ay (Poetic Diction 47-85). Eventually, single m eanings in language became 
divided into "contrasted p a irs—the abstract and the concrete, particular and 
general, objective and subjective" (85). This happened  because, again, people 
started thinking this way. But how  is it that people thought the way they did in 
the past?
Barfield's answer is that "those m ysterious relations between separate 
external objects, and between objects and feelings or ideas [...] exist 
independently, not indeed of Thought, bu t of any individual th inker" (86). There 
are vast relations of m eaning in life itself, apart from  any such relations people 
assign w ith a linguistic label. These relations exist because "Thought" exists 
independent of hum an  thinkers. There is a visible parallel in Lewis's system. 
Before his conversion Lewis saw that Reason m ust be a quality  of God, that God 
w as Reason H im self (Surprised by Joy 228). N ature is perm eated w ith  m eaning 
because it is perm eated w ith Thought.
The ancient languages prove that these m eanings or relationships were 
apprehended by people as "direct perceptual experience" (Poetic Diction 86). 
They "observed a unity" and w ere not, therefore, "conscious of relation" (86). The 
relation was not a relation bu t a rea lity—the objects connected or the object and 
idea connected w ere not seen as separate-but-connected; they w ere seen as one. 
"But," Barfield continues, "we, in the developm ent of consciousness, have lost 
the pow er to see this one as one" (86-87). Lewis's thinking is similar here. In 
English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, for example, he chronicles the 
increasing separation of subject from  object from  the late M iddle Ages to the 
Rom antic Period:
By reducing Nature to her mathematical elements it [the new astronomy] 
substituted a mechanical for a genial or animistic conception of the 
universe. The world was emptied, first of her indwelling spirits, then of 
her occult sympathies and antipathies, finally of her colours, smells, and 
tastes. [...] The result was dualism rather than materialism. The mind, on 
whose ideal constructions the whole method depended, stood over 
against its object in ever sharper dissimilarity. Man w ith his new powers 
became rich like Midas but all that he touched had gone dead and cold.
This process, slowly working, ensured during the next century the loss of 
the old mythical imagination: the conceit, and later the personified 
abstraction, takes its place. Later still, as a desperate attempt to bridge a 
gulf which begins to be found intolerable, we have the Nature poetry of 
the Romantics. (3-4)
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Reality was "once self-evident, and therefore not conceptually 
experienced," bu t now  such know ing can "only be reached by  an effort of the 
individual m in d —this is w hat is contained in a true poetic m etaphor, and every 
m etaphor is true" (Poetic Diction 88). Barfield explains this latter point in an 
appendix: "The distinction between true and false m etaphor corresponds to the 
distinction between M yth and Allegory, allegory being a m ore or less conscious 
hypostatization of ideas [...] and m yth  the true child of M eaning, begotten on 
im agination" (201). M yth, or true m etaphor, is the act of perceiving a un ity  (of 
objects or an object and an idea) not as an abstract relationship bu t a concrete 
singularity.
Barfield illustrates:
We find poet after poet expressing in metaphor and simile the analogy 
between death and sleep and winter, and again between birth and waking 
and summer, and these, once more, are constantly made the types of a 
spiritual experience—of the death in the individual soul of its accidental 
part and the putting on of incorruption. [ . ]
Now by our definition of a 'true metaphor', there should be some older, 
undivided 'meaning' from which all these logically disconnected, but 
poetically connected ideas have sprung. And in the beautiful m yth of 
Demeter and Persephone we find precisely such a meaning. In the m yth of 
Demeter the ideas of waking and sleeping, of summer and winter, of life 
and death, of mortality and immortality are all lost in one pervasive 
meaning. (91)
Different ideas find singular un ity  in m yth. The connections are not logical but 
analogical, associative, visible in the imagination. They are varied and multiple, 
and so Barfield claims that m yth  is the true child of m eaning, that is, in m yth 
there is a m ultiplicity of m eaning. We catch here a h in t of Lewis's new  N arnia 
w here everything means m ore. "M ythology," Barfield continues, "is the ghost of 
concrete m eaning. Connections between discrete phenom ena, connections which 
are now apprehended  as m etaphor, were once perceived as im m ediate realities" 
(Poetic Diction 92).
We turned  to Barfield in order to find out how  m yth communicates 
apart from  language. Answer: m yth  as a m ode of languaging communicates 
holistic m eaning to our im m ediate perceptions. It bypasses the abstracting reason 
and linear (time-bound) language (which is to say it bypasses the cognitive space 
betw een sign and signified) and enters immediately, intuitively into our 
understand ing  so that it is not an abstraction containing m eaning, bu t rather is an 
im m ediate, experiential reality. It is concrete thought. Im agine a line on a 
chalkboard representing  a spectrum. At one end of the line appears the w ord
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"Abstract," and the other end the w ord "Concrete." The instructor applies these 
kinds of know ing to the definition of a m an. Thus, at the abstract end of the 
spectrum  is w ritten a dictionary definition of a m an, followed by a poetical 
expression of a man, a photograph of a man, and, at the concrete end of the 
spectrum , the instructor h im self standing beneath the line:
Abstract____________________←M AN →___________________Concrete
A man (male gender "What a piece of [Photograph] The instructor 
of the species) is a work is a man, how himself
bi-pedal primate noble in reason, how 
capable of speech. infinite in faculties . . ."
(Hamlet 2.2.292-93)
N ow here in this spectrum  do we yet see concrete thought. Even the photograph 
perceived in the im agination is an abstraction of the real m an, despite its close 
approxim ation to the concrete reality. But w here in this spectrum  do we fit 
Tolkien's hobbits? A dm ittedly hobbits are like people, a version of the hum an, 
bu t in Tolkien's m yth  they are not hum an beings, and therefore they are not 
abstractions of anything. H obbits are concrete realities; they are real im aginary 
objects, that is, concrete objects of thought in the sense that, w hen our m inds turn  
to hobbits, we both think about and experience them  at the same time. M yth 
allows subject to com mingle w ith  object w ith greater im m ediacy and intimacy, 
and it allows thinking and experiencing to occur simultaneously. The agent of 
com m ingling in the hum an m ind, the place into w hich m yth  can enter w ith 
im m ediate, intuitive understand ing  and be, as Barfield says, 'begotten,' is the 
im agination.
Lewis's reason for the loss of concrete thought differs from  Barfield's. 
W here Barfield's A nthroposophic philosophy looks to the evolution of 
consciousness, Lewis roots the epistemological dilem m as in a long process of 
separation that begins in the fall. H is theory is of a gradual de-evolution of 
hum an  knowing, an epistemological decay. Passages heretofore quoted from  The 
Last Battle, Letters to Malcolm, The Great Divorce, and "M yth Became Fact" have 
already suggested the epistemological superiority of know ing in heaven over 
know ing on earth. Lewis believed that this has not always been the case on earth, 
bu t that the splits that occurred in hum an know ing began w ith  the fall and 
increased w ith  time. We see the beginnings of this idea in Perelandra.
W hen Ransom  arrives on the unfallen w orld of Perelandra, he 
experiences a place sim ilar to tha t "M ountain of m yth" or "heaven of legend and 
im agination" w hich Lewis describes in "M yth Became Fact" (66). It is a place 
which, like myth, is beyond w ords. Ransom  is frustrated  in try ing to relate his 
story to his friends on earth because "it is w ords that are vague. The reason w hy
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the thing can't be expressed is that it's too definite for language" (Perelandra 33). 
Ransom  describes his early experience on the planet as involving a "sensation 
not of following an adventure bu t of enacting a m yth" (47), and he w onders if 
"all the things which appeared as m ythology on earth  [were] scattered through 
other w orlds as realities" after seeing the dragon beneath the fruit tree and 
recognizing an image of "the garden of the H esperides" (45). Perelandra is an 
unfallen w orld and a planet w here reality is mythic. Lewis reveals his theory 
about epistemological splits and the fall later in the novel w hen Ransom  comes 
to realize that he m ust defeat his dem on-possessed adversary, the U n-m an, 
through physical combat. Ransom  concludes,
Long since on Mars, and more strongly since he came to Perelandra, 
Ransom had been perceiving that the triple distinction of truth from myth 
and both from fact was purely terrestrial—was part and parcel of that 
unhappy division between soul and body which resulted from the Fall. 
(143-44)
As M artha Sammons aptly sum m arizes in her analysis of Lewis's 
epistemological thinking in Perelandra, "Since the fall in the G arden of Eden, m an 
has separated subject from  object, the phenom enal from  the invisible num inous 
world, and how he experiences from  what he experiences. The first result of this 
split was the dem ythologization of the physical w orld, w hich has taken us 
further and further aw ay from  the m eaning of objects" (152). Sammons makes 
m yth  an integral part of know ing (as Lewis does in "M yth Became Fact") and its 
absence the cause of the loss of m eaning in the world. That the split begins in the 
fall does not m ean, though, that it occurred all at once. Lewis describes a w orld 
closer to its unfallen state in That Hideous Strength. Says Dimble, one of Ransom's 
faithful friends: "The Earth itself was m ore like an anim al in those days. And 
m ental processes w ere m uch m ore like physical actions" (284). Shortly afterw ard 
Dimble notes that M erlin is the "last vestige of an old order in w hich m atter and 
spirit were, from  our m odern  point of view, confused" (285). Clearly Lewis is 
positing a tim e w hen the abstract/concrete division in hum an know ing w as 
alm ost unknow n.
Lewis believes that the fall of m an led eventually to a subject/object split 
in hum an knowing, that hum an consciousness in the past involved m ental 
processes being m uch m ore like physical actions, that the subject/object split led 
to a separation of concrete experiencing and abstract thinking, and that this 
separation developed over a period of tim e beginning from  the fall w here the 
separation of spirit from  m atter first began. Recall that Lewis traced a thousand 
years of this developm ent briefly in English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (3­
4), and in Miracles (as well as in the passage we read from  Letters to Malcolm) he
Mythlore 25:3/4 Spring/Summer 2007   175
Charlie W. Starr
predicts its conclusion, an end to the subject/object split and the problem  of 
knowing:
The old, richly imaginative thought which still survives in Plato has to 
submit to the deathlike, but indispensable, process of logical analysis: 
nature and spirit, matter and mind, fact and myth, the literal and the 
metaphorical, have to be more and more sharply separated, till at last a 
purely mathematical universe and a purely subjective mind confront one 
another across an unbridgeable chasm. But from this descent also, if 
thought itself is to survive, there must be re-ascent and the Christian 
conception provides for it. Those who attain the glorious resurrection will 
see the dry bones clothed again w ith flesh, the fact and myth remarried, 
the literal and the metaphorical rushing together. (Miracles 211-12)
Lewis's u ltim ate solution to the dilem m as of know ing is an eschatological one. In 
a slow process of descent, a holistic kind of thinking natural to any unfallen 
A dam  and Eve (w hether Terran or Perelandrian), a kind of thinking that w as still 
present even as late as Plato, gives way to a system  of logical analysis which 
separates thought from  experience. However, a new  nature is to come w herein 
heaven and earth, the w orlds of spirit and matter, become one (211). The old 
shadow lands will end. Real life will begin.
M yth acts like a language bu t is not language, nor does it depend  on 
language to be com m unicated. M yth can be com m unicated in ways other than 
language, and it com m unicates m ore than language can: "Because it is so m uch 
'la rger ' than words, m yth  allows us to go beyond the lim itations of language" 
(Sammons 154). M yth solves the problem  of know ing by rem oving abstraction 
from  the equation. In m yth  the object is not external to the subject once the story 
pattern  is perceived. The m yth  is a real object of thought, a sub-created, concrete 
reality, in tended not to represent reality outside itself (though such 
representations occur w hen we allegorize from  m yth), bu t to be sim ply w hat it is, 
a pattern  of the reality behind (not a pattern  about that reality bu t an actual taste of 
the reality itself). M yth draw s the im agination tow ard  concrete know ing here in 
the valley of abstraction. It is able to do w hat tru th  and reason cannot do in our 
fallen world.
H aving said this, we should not be quick to reject language as an 
ineffectual m ode of knowing. Language can come close in m etaphor to doing 
w hat m yth  does. Barfield introduced us to the "true m etaphor" in Poetic Diction 
(87), a poetic constructing of language which yields m eaningful connection 
betw een objects w here the connection itself, the relationship, takes on the quality 
of the very real. M etaphor is w here language can come close to being concrete 
here in the valley of abstraction. In the highest reality, language connects subject 
to object so com pletely that object is converted to m eaning, and know ing to
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experience. But in our phenom enal world, language abstracts the real; 
nevertheless, in m etaphor language is able to come closer to fulfilling its function 
of un iting  thinking and experiencing in the knower.
We have now  come to the point at w hich we can m ake sense of Lewis's 
definition of m eaning in "Bluspels and Flalansferes." We can posit the following 
explanations for the various elem ents of the peculiar final paragraph: tru th  is an 
abstract statem ent of correspondence w ith reality obtained by reason which 
operates in the abstract. If a statem ent is not true, then it is false. M eaning, 
however, is a product of im aginative connection through m etaphor. The opposite 
of m eaning is sim ply non-m eaning, or as Lewis says, "nonsense"; thus, if no 
m eaning is found or seen in a connection, then we w ould  say the connection is 
m eaningless or not really a connection at all. W hether or not a m eaning 
corresponds to reality (w hether or not it is true) is som ething that m ust be 
determ ined by reason.
But we cannot reason unless we have som ething to reason about. The 
"som ething to reason about" is not only reality bu t im aginatively perceived 
connections in reality. Furtherm ore, we cannot reason w ithout a tool to reason 
w ith  and this tool is language which m ust rely on m etaphor (as "Bluspels" 
shows) and w hich cannot be purely  literal.5 M eaning, moreover, is the 
"antecedent condition" for tru th  and, therefore, the act of reasoning can be 
explained as follows: First, language is m etaphorical, that is, language functions 
by m aking meaningful connections between a sign and a signified. Second, 
reasoning to tru th  consists of arriving at language statem ents w hich correspond 
w ith  reality. Therefore, if reason always depends on language (even the language 
of m athem atics) in order to function, it will always depend  on m eaning w hich is 
central to the function of language.
M eaning is also antecedent to reason in the sense that, while reason 
attem pts to m ake connections between thought and reality, m eaning is not 
lim ited to correspondences between thought and reality. Some m eanings m ay be 
false, some true in term s of correspondence to reality, bu t m eaning is about m ore 
than just reality. For example, the connection I m ake between Toni M orrison's 
novel Beloved and m y ow n m other's death, w hich occurred w hile I was reading 
the novel, has no real w orld correspondence, no tru th  or falsehood, though it has 
m eaning to me.
At the same tim e Lewis says there m ust be a "kind of tru th  or rightness 
in the im agination," that there is a "tru th  of the m etaphor itself." If our thinking 
is ever "true" then our m etaphors m ust have been "good." W hat m akes a
5 Myth in its purest form is not a tool for reasoning since it bypasses language; however, it 
can be converted into such a tool when it is allegorized into abstract language statements.
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m etaphor "good" and w hat is the kind of "rightness" in the im agination that can 
be called a kind of "tru th"? The answer lies at the end of "Bluspels and 
Flalansferes." The final puzzling  paragraph continues:
It does follow that if those original equations, between good and light, or 
evil and dark, between breath and soul and all the others, were from the 
beginning arbitrary and fanciful—if there is not, in fact, a kind of psycho­
physical parallelism (or more) in the universe—then all our thinking is 
nonsensical. But we cannot, without contradiction, believe it to be 
nonsensical. And so, admittedly, the view I have taken has metaphysical 
implications. But so has every view. (158)
Perhaps the "psycho-physical parallelism  [...] in the universe" to w hich Lewis 
refers is Barfield's idea that m eanings, connections, have their ow n reality: "M en 
do no t invent those m ysterious relations between separate external objects, and 
betw een objects and feelings or ideas, w hich it is the function of poetry to reveal. 
These relations exist independently, not indeed of Thought, bu t of any individual 
th inker" (Poetic Diction 86). Perhaps the "psycho-physical parallelism " is Lewis's 
idea that m an is connected to reality supernaturally, perhaps by  spirit as has been 
discussed before, perhaps by the essence of M ind that is God H im self (hence the 
reference to "m etaphysical implications"). The "kind" of "im aginative tru th" 
Lewis refers to here, then, w ould be reality perceived in the im agination. "Good" 
m etaphors are those tha t m ake n o t "true" connections (in Lewis's sense of tru th  
as abstract statem ents in "M yth Became Fact") b u t "real" connections in a 
Barfieldian sense w here "good and light" som ehow are one, as are "evil and 
dark" and "breath and soul." H ere im agination grasps tru th  because it is the 
concrete tru th  of a higher reality, only in this instance the higher is somehow 
am ong the lower; it is archetypal and interior (like the new  N arn ia—further in as 
well as further u p  [Last Battle 224-25]), holding our ow n reality together w ith 
connections that are concretely real b u t visible only as m etaphor, as m eanings in 
the im agination.
We m ay sum m arize the results of this exploration as follows:
1. M eaning is seen connection, relationship rightly perceived in 
the im agination.
2. H eaven is that higher reality in which everything m eans m ore 
because m atter and spirit, and therefore subject and object, are m ore 
com pletely connected there, and one-for-one abstract thoughts give 
w ay to the m ultiplicity of concrete-experiential thought.
3. M eaning m akes know ing possible and is m ore closely tied to 
im agination and experience than to reason and (abstracting) truth. 
M eaning begins in the imagination. Perceived relations occur as
178 Mythlore 97/98 Spring/Summer 2007
Meaning, Meanings, and Epistemology in  C.S. Lewis
im aginative perceptions of m etaphor. M eanings become the 
"antecedent condition" for the operation of reason ("Bluspels" 157).
4. M eaning can be figurative or literal (as literal as Lewis allows 
language to be in his "Bluspels" critique).
5. M eaning can be concrete or abstract: it can be concrete either 
as im aginative connections, or genuinely concrete, i.e. Barfield's "true 
m etaphors" (Poetic Diction 87) and "concrete m eaning" (92), or Lewis's 
"psycho-physical parallelism " ("Bluspels" 158); it can also be abstract, 
i.e. "M yth Became Fact" w here some m eanings correspond to reality 
and w hen stated abstractly become tru ths (66).
The Minor Theme: M eanings in Texts
Lewis has a great deal to say about m eaning in literature and th 
problem s of correct interpretation. In the brief survey that follows, we mo 
aw ay from  the epistemological problem  of defining m eaning and to the critic 
problem  of the m eaning of a text. H ere Lewis is not concerned only w ith th 
definition of m eaning as "signification" bu t also w ith W ebster's first definition 
m eaning: "intention." In this case, Lewis deals w ith w hat texts m ean and wh 
their authors intended. Lewis's view regarding w here m eaning resides in relatio 
to a text can best be described by a passage from  George M acDonald, a w rit 
w ho influenced Lewis greatly:
One difference between God's work and man's is, that, while God's work 
cannot mean more than he meant, man's must m ean more than he meant.
For in everything that God has made, there is layer upon layer of 
ascending significance; also he expresses the same thought in higher and 
higher kinds of that thought: it is God's things, his embodied thoughts, 
which alone a m an has to use, modified and adapted to his own purposes, 
for the expression of his thoughts; therefore he cannot help his words and 
figures falling into such combinations in the m ind of another as he had 
himself not foreseen, so many are the thoughts allied to every other 
thought, so many are the relations involved in every figure, so many the 
facts hinted in every symbol. ("The Fantastic Imagination" 320-21)
This concept is echoed by Lewis in several instances:
"Creation" as applied to hum an authorship [...] seems to me an entirely 
misleading term. We make £<; unoxELgevmv [with regard to what lies at 
hand] i.e. we re-arrange elements He has provided. There is not a vestige of 
real creativity de novo in us. Try to imagine a new primary colour, a third 
sex, a fourth dimension, or even a monster wh. does not consist of bits of 
existing animals stuck together! Nothing happens. And that surely is why
Mythlore 25:3/4 Spring/Summer 2007   179
Charlie W. Starr
our works [...] never mean to others quite what we intended: because we 
are re-combining elements made by Him and already containing His 
meanings. Because of those divine meanings in our materials it is 
impossible we shd. ever know the whole meaning of our own works, and 
the meaning we never intended may be the best and truest one. (Collected 
Letters 20 February 1943, 555)
O n the issue of authorial intention (or authorial m eaning), Lewis gives the 
following m ore detailed explication:
I have said vaguely 'meaning' or 'intention'. We shall have to give each 
w ord a fairly definite sense. It is the author who intends; the book means.
The author's intention is that which, if it is realised, will in his eyes 
constitute success. If all or most readers, or such readers as he chiefly 
desires, laugh at a passage, and he is pleased with this result, then his 
intention was comic, or he intended to be comic. [...] Meaning is a much 
more difficult term. [...] The nearest I have yet got to a definition is 
something like this: the meaning of a book is the series or system of 
emotions, reflections, and attitudes produced by reading it. But of course 
this product differs with different readers. The ideally false or wrong 
'meaning' would be the product in the mind of the stupidest and least 
sensitive and most prejudiced reader after a single careless reading. The 
ideally true or right 'meaning' would be that shared (in some measure) by 
the largest number of the best readers after repeated and careful readings 
over several generations, different periods, nationalities, moods, degrees 
of alertness, private pre-occupations, states of health, spirits and the like 
canceling one another out when (this is an important reservation) they 
cannot be fused so as to enrich one another. ("On Criticism" 139-40)
The first part of the definition of m eaning in this passage, "the series or system of 
emotions, reflections, and attitudes produced by  reading it," m atches the 
definition heretofore given of m eaning as connection or relationship. But then 
Lewis discusses "false" and "true" meanings. Do not m eanings, however, 
precede tru th  or falsehood? Meaning certainly does, but, as m entioned at the 
beginning of this section, we are no longer exam ining Lewis's definition of 
m eaning bu t have tu rned  to his theory of literary interpretation, of finding 
meanings in a text. H e argues that those m eanings are true w hich the vast 
m ajority of the best readers th roughout the years agree correspond to the text, 
and those m eanings are false w hich occur in the m ind  of the m ost careless and 
prejudiced reader after a single reading. This is not to say that there are no 
m eanings in the m ind  of the poor reader.
In contrast to the authorial intent of m an is the authorial in tent of God, 
in w hich m eanings m ultip ly  beyond those of any individual hum an  w riter. This
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is especially the case in the w ritings of the Bible. Lewis discusses this idea at 
length in Reflections on the Psalms:
Hitherto we have been trying to read the Psalms as we suppose—or I 
suppose—their poets meant them to be read. But this of course is not the 
way in which they have chiefly been used by Christians. They have been 
believed to contain a second or hidden meaning, an "allegorical" sense, 
concerned w ith the central truths of Christianity, w ith the Incarnation, the 
Passion, the Resurrection, the Ascension, and with the Redemption of 
man. All the Old Testament has been treated in the same way. The full 
significance of what the writers are saying is, on this view, apparent only 
in the light of events which happened after they were dead. (84)
Lewis notes that a "second m eanings" approach to interpretation is distrusted by 
"the m odern  m ind" and also open to "self-deception." H e claims that the 
approach m ust be kept, how ever, for two reasons. First, if the biblical texts are 
inspired, then m ultiple m eanings are likely since G od fills creation, including 
books, w ith a greater m ultiplicity of m eanings than any individual author could 
p u t into the text (98). H is second reason for reading "second m eanings" into the 
O ld Testament texts is that Jesus d id  the same thing. On the road to Em m aus, for 
example, H e show ed the fulfillment of O ld Testament texts in H is ow n life: "He 
accepted—indeed H e claimed to b e —the second m eaning of Scripture" (98-99).
W o r k s  C i t e d
Abbott, Edwin A. Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions. 1884. New York: Dover, 1992. 
Barfield, Owen. Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning. 1928. Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 1973. 
Honda, Mineko. The Imaginative World of C. S. Lewis: A Way to Participate in Reality. New 
York: University Press of America, 2000.
Hooper, Walter. "Oxford's Bonny Fighter." C.S. Lewis at the Breakfast Table and Other 
Reminiscences. Ed. James T. Como. New York: Macmillan, 1979. 137- 85.
Huttar, Charles A. "A Lifelong Love Affair with Language: C.S. Lewis's Poetry." Word and 
Story in C. S. Lewis. Eds. Charles A. Huttar and Peter J. Schakel., U of Missouri P, 
1991. 86-108.
Lewis, C.S. All My Road Before Me: The Diary of C.S. Lewis 1922-1927. Ed. Walter Hooper. San 
Diego: Harvest/HBJ, 1991.
Mythlore 25:3/4 Spring/Summer 2007   181
Charlie W. Starr
— . "Bluspels and Flalansferes: A Semantic Nightmare." Rehabilitations and Other Essays.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1939. 133-158.
—. The Collected Letters of C.S. Lewis: Books, Broadcasts, and the War: 1931-1949. Vol. 2. Ed. 
Walter Hooper. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2004.
— . English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama. The Oxford History of English
Literature 3. Oxford: Clarendon, 1954.
—. An Experiment in Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1961.
—, ed. George MacDonald: An Anthology. 1946. London: Fount Paperbacks, 1990.
—. The Great Divorce. New York: Collier, 1946.
— . "Is Theology Poetry?" The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses. Ed. Walter Hooper. New
York: Macmillan, 1980. 74-92.
—. The Last Battle. New York: Harper Collins, 1956.
—. Letters of C.S. Lewis. Ed. W. H. Lewis. Rev. ed. Ed. Walter Hooper. San Diego: 
Harvest/HBJ, 1993.
—. Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer. San Diego: Harvest/HBJ, 1964.
—. Miracles: A Preliminary Study. 1947. New York: Touchstone, 1975.
— . "Myth Became Fact." God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics. Ed. Walter Hooper.
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970. 63-67.
— . "On Criticism." On Stories and Other Essays on Literature. Ed. Walter Hooper. San Diego:
Harvest/HBJ, 1982. 127-141.
—. Perelandra. New York: Macmillan, 1944.
—. A Preface to Paradise Lost. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1942.
—. The Problem of Pain. New York: Macmillan, 1940.
—. Reflections on the Psalms. London: Fontana, 1958.
—. Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life. San Diego: Harvest/HBJ, 1955.
—. That Hideous Strength: A Modern Fairy-Tale for Grown-Ups. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 
MacDonald, George. "The Fantastic Imagination." A Dish of Orts: Chiefly Papers on the 
Imagination and on Shakespeare. 1893. Edenbridge: Norwood, 1977. 313-22.
Myers, Doris, T. "Spenser." Reading the Classics with C.S. Lewis. Ed. Thomas L. Martin. 
Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000. 87-104.
Payne, Leanne. Real Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Works of C.S. Lewis. Westchester, Illinois: 
Cornerstone, 1979.
Piehler, Paul. "Myth or Allegory? Archetype and Transcendence in the Fiction of C.S. 
Lewis." Word and Story in C. S. Lewis. Eds. Peter J. Schakel and Charles A. Huttar. 
Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1991. 199-212
—. "Visions and Revisions: C. S. Lewis's Contributions to the Theory of Allegory." The Taste 
of the Pineapple: Essays on C.S. Lewis as Reader, Critic, and Imaginative Writer. Ed. Bruce 
L. Edwards. Bowling Green: Bowling Green State U Popular P, 1988. 79-91.
Sammons, Martha C. "A Far Off Country": A Guide to C.S. Lewis's Fantasy Fiction. New York: 
University Press of America, 2000.
182 Mythlore 97/98 Spring/Summer 2007
